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Number bisection taskThe feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or
calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of
mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive
feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the
task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number presented in the middle of a triplet
corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our
results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of
the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast
metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance.
Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each
triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved.
Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where
they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers
than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious
FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined
by the fluency of the NBT.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
When solving math problems such as multiplication or division,
people sometimes get the (gut) feeling that their calculations
have gone wrong and that, therefore, they should not endorse
the output of their mental calculation. This feeling appears as a
spontaneous phenomenal experience that points to the fact that
the calculation might be mistaken and motivates the reasoner to
revise what she has been doing. Everyday observation suggests
that this phenomenon is not restricted to the classroom; it gener-
alizes to all contexts where people carry out mental actions, such
as making mental rotations when calculating their way from one
point to another by using a map, deciding between two possible
actions, reasoning about the probability of an event, or mentally
calculating how much money they spent in the last week. In situ-
ations like these, people sometimes report experiencing a ‘‘feelingof error” (henceforth FOE) that alerts them about a possible
mistake in their mental processing. The subjective experience that
something went wrong is assumed to arise during or right after the
mental action and is fundamental for further correction and
improvement in calculating and reasoning.
The FOE has been classified as a metacognitive or epistemic
feeling in the literature on metacognition (Arango-Muñoz, 2014;
Gangemi & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2014; Thompson & Johnson,
2014). Accordingly, the FOE is conceived as a phenomenal experi-
ence directed toward a mental state, process or disposition, that
motivates certain behaviors such as changing the strategy or
checking the outcome of a mental action (for an overview see
Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian, 2014; De Sousa, 2009; Moulin &
Souchay, 2013). Metacognitive feelings are particularly interesting
because they make people aware of mental conditions that they
would not notice in the absence of such feelings. For instance, in
the case of the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, the feeling points
to the agent that she is in possession of a piece of information
although she has no access to it in her memory, and so motivates
the individual to keep trying to remember (Brown & McNeill,
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2012 for a recent review).
Most of the empirical studies working on metacognitive feel-
ings and reasoning have focused on positive feelings whereby the
person detects a correct answer. For example, Boekaerts and
Rozendaal (2010) assessed students’ confidence in a mathematical
task where students had to report their confidence on a 10 point
scale before and after they had produced the solution to two types
of mathematical problems: computation and application prob-
lems.1 Predominantly, they found effects of the type of mathematical
problem (computation and application problem) and the time of
measurement (before or after solving the problem) on the accuracy
of the confidence. Similarly, the feeling of rightness (henceforth
FOR) has been addressed by Thompson, Prowse Turner, and
Pennycook (2011); they investigated the FOR after individuals solved
conditional reasoning and syllogistic problems. Participants had to
provide an initial, intuitive response to the reasoning problem, as
well as a retrospective evaluation of their intuitive answer based
on their FOR. The authors reported a negative correlation between
the FOR and the reaction time of the initial intuitive response, such
that fluent processing (as indicated by shorter reaction times) was
associated with a higher FOR.
On the other hand, the studies addressing performance moni-
toring by negative feelings, like the feeling of error, have followed
two different traditions. One focuses on error detection and error
awareness of bodily actions (see Wessel, 2012 for a review), and
the other focuses on the metacognitive feeling of error related to
reasoning (Gangemi & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2014; Thompson &
Johnson, 2014). The first tradition uses behavioral paradigms such
as the Go/No-Go (Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011; Murphy,
Robertson, Allen, Hester, & O’Connell, 2012), the flanker task
(Hughes & Yeung, 2011; Scheffers & Coles, 2000) and the anti-
saccade paradigm (Endrass, Franke, & Kathmann, 2005;
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001) to study
the detection and awareness of erroneous bodily movements.
Often, these researchers are also interested in determining
whether the electrophysiological indices of cortical error process-
ing (i.e., error related negativity (ERN) or the error positivity
(Pe)) are associated with error awareness (Boldt & Yeung, 2015;
Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). In contrast, the second tradition,
focuses on the detection and awareness of erroneous mental
reasoning episodes, and therefore uses logical, probabilistic and
mathematical reasoning tasks (De Neys, 2012; De Neys,
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Gangemi
& Bourgeois-Gironde, 2014).
These two traditions have developed their own methods,
paradigms and models in parallel without any interaction. One of
the aims of this paper is to bridge this gap by integrating elements
from the two perspectives. On the one hand, following the error
detection tradition, we chose a speeded button press task
(Murphy et al., 2012; Rabbitt, 1966) in which a mathematical task
was embedded. On the other hand, the mathematical task was
chosen to evoke reasoning errors, as has been done in the metacog-
nitive error awareness literature (De Neys, 2012; Gangemi &
Bourgeois-Gironde, 2014). These factors allowed a close examina-
tion of participants’ behavior related to error monitoring, thereby
merging the two traditions. The novelty of this approach is that
it incorporates reasoning and/or mental calculation errors in the
framework of error detection, which has traditionally focused on
action or motor errors. Furthermore, following the metacognitive1 An example of an application problem: ‘‘The Mount Everest has the highes
mountaintop on earth. Its height is 8848 m above sea level. The lowest point of the
earth’s crust is in the Pacific Ocean at 11,034 m below sea level. What is the difference
between the highest and the lowest points on earth?”. An example of a computation
problem: ‘‘68.2  4.73 = . . .?”.ttradition, we additionally asked for introspective reports about the
feelings that accompanied the task (Koriat, 2000, 2007; Reder &
Ritter, 1992; Gangemi et al., 2014) and used established measures,
such as the Gamma correlation, to assess the accuracy of the feel-
ings (Koren, Seidman, Goldsmith, & Harvey, 2006; Nelson, 1984). In
line with both traditions, we also asked participants to rate their
confidence (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000; Yeung
& Summerfield, 2012).
With this integrative goal in mind, we considered three specific
aims and three hypotheses. First, we wanted to determine the
accuracy of the FOE. Based on previous studies on metamemory
(Koriat, 2000; Paynter, Reder, & Kieffaber, 2009; Reder & Ritter,
1992) and metareasoning studies (Gangemi & Bourgeois-Gironde,
2014), we hypothesized that: (1) the FOE in a reasoning task is a
reliable signal of error (as is the case in error detection on motor
tasks). That is, we expect that participants would mainly report
having a FOE after having committed a mistake in their calculation.
Second, we were interested in defining the determinants of the
FOE. Two main factors that have been proposed in the literature as
determinants of metacognitive feelings were considered with this
goal: fluency and post-decision evaluation. In the tradition of
metacognitive studies, fluency refers to the ease with which a
piece of information is processed and/or comes to the mind
(Oppenheimer, 2008; Schwarz, 2010), for example, the speed with
which an item is retrieved from memory (Benjamin, Bjork, &
Schwartz, 1998; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005, see Koriat, 2007 for a
review). Accordingly, if fluency plays a role in the FOE reports, then
there should be a higher probability of no-FOE reports for fluent
calculations, and higher probability of FOE reports for disfluent
calculations (Jiang & Hong, 2014; Thompson, 2009; Thompson
et al., 2011). Therefore, we hypothesized that: (2.1) if the FOE is
determined by fluency processing, participants will report less
FOEs on fluent trials as compared to disfluent trials. The second
factor that has been proposed as a determinant of metacognitive
feelings is post-decision evaluation process. Metacognitive tradi-
tion on error monitoring specifies that this process occurs after
acting or making a decision and serves in evaluating the likelihood
that the decision or action will result in a favorable or unfavorable
outcome (Vickers & Lee, 1998, 2000). According to Vickers and Lee
(1998, 2000), metacognitive feelings of confidence and error are
the product of an accumulator system that progressively and
continuously accumulates and evaluates evidence in favor of or
against the initial response (see Yeung & Summerfield, 2012 for a
review). In other words, participants keep considering the problem
and checking their answer after giving the answer to the problem,
and this post-evaluation leads to error detection and subsequent
behavioral slowdown, even in the absence of feedback (Rabbitt,
1966). The behavioral slowdown is not restricted to the primary
task (e.g., the mathematical task in our experimental design), but
it can generalize and affect other immediately following tasks, as
has been demonstrated by recent studies (Cho, Orr, Cohen, &
Carter, 2009; Forster & Cho, 2014; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011).
Thus, given that error detection is normally followed by a slow-
down in the subsequent behavior, the reaction time of the FOE
report (the task that immediately follows the mathematical
calculation in our experimental design) can be used as an index
of a continued post-decision evaluation process. Based on these
considerations, we hypothesized that: (2.2) if the FOE is
determined by a post-decision evaluation, we expect to find that
participants take longer to report whether or not they had a FOE
in the mathematical task after having committed an error, com-
pared to when they had made no error; we also expect participants
to take longer to report FOEs than to report no-FOEs.
Our third and last aim was to explore the extent to which par-
ticipants were sensitive to their missed errors, that is, participants’
sensitivity to the errors they fail to report (i.e., after no-FOE report).
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pants commit errors and often overlook them (i.e., do not provide a
FOE report), they may have different degrees of awareness
concerning their mistakes. For example, they might report low
confidence after not reporting a FOE. There is a growing literature
that points to the fact that subjects implicitly detect or are slightly
aware of some of their ‘‘unreported” errors (De Neys, 2012, 2014;
De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys et al., 2011). To test whether
participants had some degree of awareness of their missed errors,
we asked participants to report their confidence in their answer
when they reported not having a FOE. Thus, we hypothesized that:
(3) if participants had some degree of awareness of their missed
errors, we expect that they will report lower confidence for missed
errors (i.e., reporting a no-FOE after an erroneous response) than
for appropriate rejections (i.e., reporting a no-FOE after a correct
response).
To test our three hypotheses we adapted the number bisection
task (henceforth NBT), a task that has been used in neuropsycho-
logical studies to assess quantitative capabilities in number
processing. Particularly, we used the verification version2 of the
NBT so as to elicit and test the FOE (material was kindly provided
by Nuerk and colleagues, cp. Nuerk et al., 2002): First, participants
were briefly presented with number triplets (e.g., 07_16_25) and
then had to quickly decide whether or not the number in the
middle of a triplet was the arithmetic mean of the two outer num-
bers by a Yes/No answer (Moeller et al., 2011; Nuerk et al., 2002).
We manipulated participants’ response window so as to increase
their likelihood of errors in the NBT and the uncertainty about the
correctness of their answers. Specifically, the response window
was individually adapted to participants’ speed so that it amounted
to the mean of the last 5 triplets (gliding window) and maximally
amounted to 2.5 s. After each trial, participants had 2 s to report
whether or not they had a FOE. This manipulation aimed at produc-
ing feeling-based assessments (Koriat, 2007; Reder & Ritter, 1992) of
their performance in the NBT.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty right-handed volunteers (15 female, mean age: 24 years;
SD = 2.9, range: 19–30) participated in the experiment for a mon-
etary compensation of 12 € per hour. Given that the main goal of
our study was to induce FOEs during mathematical reasoning, we
did not recruit participants who could be assumed to be mathe-
matically inclined, that is, we excluded engineers, mathematicians
or physicists, for whom the NBT might have been too easy. Data
from two participants had to be excluded from the analyses since
they did not follow the instructions, i.e., they skipped over all the
questions about the FOE without answering.2.2. Stimuli and design
We used 200 triplets from the NBT by Nuerk et al. (2002). These
triplets were selected from a set of originally 360 triplets based on
difficulty measures from previous studies. Namely, we chose the
25 most difficult triplets of each of the 8 categories (see below),
based on the reaction times of participants for solving each triplet
from a study by Moeller, Wood, Doppelmayr, and Nuerk (2010).2 The verification version of the NBT is answered by a yes–no answer, as opposed to
the production version of the NBT in which participants only get the 2 outer numbers
and have to produce and write down the correct arithmetic mean, if it exists for the
corresponding trial (Moeller, Klein, Fischer, Nuerk, & Willmes, 2011; Nuerk, Geppert,
van Herten, & Willmes, 2002).This selection was done to increase the likelihood of evoking FOEs
in the present study.
Triplets were categorized into bisectable and non-bisectable
triplets following Nuerk et al. (2002). On the one hand, bisectable
triplets correspond to triplets in which the middle number is the
arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers, e.g., 12_21_30.
Non-bisectable triplets, on the other hand, are triplets in which
the middle number is not the arithmetic mean, e.g., 19_25_29.
Participants’ performance on the NBT was evaluated using four
mathematical factors – two for each triplet’s category – that have
been shown to influence participants’ reaction times (fluency)
and accuracy while solving the NBT (Moeller et al., 2011; Nuerk
et al., 2002). We thus propose that if fluency is a decisive factor
for the FOE reports, fluent triplets – as determined by the factors
listed below – would elicit less FOE reports compared to disfluent
triplets, which would elicit more FOE reports. The two factors con-
sidered for the bisectable triplets were multiplicativity and range.
The factor multiplicativity specified whether the triplet belonged
to a multiplication table, e.g., 16_20_24, or not, e.g., 22_26_30.
Triplets that belong to multiplication table are henceforth labeled
as multiplicative triplets, and triplets that do not belong as
non-multiplicative ones. Previous studies (Moeller et al., 2010;
Nuerk et al., 2002) reported non-multiplicative triplets as being
more difficult, i.e., have greater error percentages and longer
reaction times than multiplicative ones. We thus expected these
triplets to be less fluent than multiplicative triplets. The factor
range indicates if the numerical distance between the outer
numbers of the triplet is small, ranging from 4 to 8, e.g.,
16_18_20 (distance between the outer numbers is 4), or large,
ranging between 12 and 18, e.g., 14_21_28 (distance between the
outer numbers is 14). Based on results from Moeller et al. (2010)
and Nuerk et al. (2002) that reported non-multiplicative triplets
with a large range to have greater error rates and longer reaction
times, we expected these triplets to be less fluent than multiplica-
tive ones with shorter ranges.
On the other hand, the factors considered for the non-bisectable
triplets were bisection possibility and distance to mean. The bisection
possibility accounted for the possibility that the outer numbers of
the triplet could in principle have an integer as arithmetic mean,
that is, the outer numbers have an integer as mean but this number
is not displayed in the middle of the triplet. For instance, the triplet
41_56_57 (which has possibility of bisection) has an arithmetic
mean of 49, whereas the (non-bisectable) triplet 12_20_21 has a
decimal as arithmetic mean, namely 16.5. Triplets that cannot be
bisected have been shown to be more fluent than triplets that
could in principle have integers as means (Moeller et al., 2010;
Nuerk et al., 2002). Finally, the distance to mean refers to the
numerical distance between the number in the middle of the tri-
plet and the actual correct arithmetic mean of the outer numbers.
The distance between these numbers can be small or large. Small
distances to mean are between 0.5 and 1.5, e.g., 25_31_35, which
has a distance to the actual mean (30) of 1. Large distances are
between 2 and 8, e.g., 47_58_59, which has distance of 5. In a nut-
shell, non-bisectable triplets that can in principle be bisectable and
have smaller distances to means are expected to be less fluent than
non-bisectable ones without bisection possibility and larger
ranges, because the former display longer reaction times and
greater error percentages than the latter (Moeller et al., 2010;
Nuerk et al., 2002). Thus, the design totaled 4 categories (2 by 2
factorial design) for the bisectable and 4 categories for the non-
bisectable triplets, hence 8 categories of triplets in total.
2.3. Procedure
After a detailed instruction about the NBT and the procedure of
the experiment, participants worked on 10 practice trials to get
Fig. 1. Diagram of the experimental procedure. Participants were first presented with three numbers and they had to decide if the middle number of this triplet was also the
integer arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers. They provided an answer by pressing Yes or No response keys. If they were too slow providing an answer a new trial
started, i.e., another triplet was presented. In case participants provided an answer (yes/no), they were then asked if they felt they had committed an error on their calculation
(FOE question). The trial progressed depending on participants’ response: (a) if participants answered they felt they had not committed an error, they were asked how confident
they were about their answer to the triplet using a 6 point Likert scale (see definition of the scale in Section 2.3), or (b) if participants answered that they felt they had
committed an error, a new trial started and another triplet was presented.
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time limit and participants received feedback about the correct-
ness of their answer after each trial. In contrast, the last 5 practice
trials had the same time restrictions as in the actual experiment
and no feedback was provided. Participants had the opportunity
to ask comprehension questions after the practice trials before
starting with the actual experiment. They were unaware of the
purpose of the experiment and were only told that they were par-
ticipating in a study investigating numerical cognition. During each
trial, participants were presented with triplets of numbers and
their task was to rapidly decide whether the number in the middle
of the triplet was the arithmetical mean of the two outer numbers
or not. (The experimental procedure is summarized in Fig. 1.) They
pressed Yes or No answer keys (index and middle finger) assigned
to the right hand to give their answers. The position (left/right) of
the Yes/No answer keys and screen display was counterbalanced
across participants. This was done maintaining position congru-
ency (left/right) between the screen display and answer keys.
The 200 triplets were individually randomized and were presented
only once during the experiment. No performance feedback was
given during the experiment. The time participants were given to
answer each NBT triplet was adaptive and 2.5 s at maximum, i.e.,
it decreased over the course of the experiment if participants
answered correctly and in less than 2.5 s. The actual time partici-
pants had for answering was calculated online trial-by-trial as
the average of the time it took them to answer the last 5 triplets.
If one or more of the last 5 triplets was answered incorrectly (or
missed) a buffer time of 2.5 s was included to calculate the average
of the current time, and if one or more of those 5 triplets was
answered correctly then its actual response time was included
for the average. The time of the first 5 triplets was calculated as
the average of the response time of the 5 practice trials (within
the time limit). This manipulation was done to increase the likeli-
hood of errors and FOEs. Immediately after participants answered
each of the triplets their error monitoring was tested by asking
them to report whether they felt they had committed an error on
their calculation or not (FOE question). Literally, the question asked
was: ‘‘Do you feel that you have committed an error?” (Haben Sie
das Gefühl, eine fehlerhafte Antwort gegeben zu haben?).Participants were instructed to answer this question as quickly
as possible within a time limit of 2 s by pressing Yes/No answer
keys assigned to the right hand (index and middle finger). This
time limit was used to capture the spontaneity of the FOE, that
is, we wanted participants to answer as quickly and spontaneously
as possible instead of basing their reports on reflective thinking
about their performance or further recalculations. If participants
answered ‘‘NO” to the FOE question, they were asked to report
their degree of confidence about their answer to the presented tri-
plet in the NBT. Their confidence was assessed using a 6 point
Likert-type scale without any time restrictions: 1 was defined as
extremely unconfident (aeusserst unsicher) and 6 as extremely confi-
dent (aeusserst sicher). The values 2–5 were defined as: 2 = very
unconfident (sehr unsicher), 3 = unconfident (unsicher), 4 = confident
(sicher), 5 = very confident (sehr sicher). As soon as participants
answered the confidence question, a new triplet was presented.
If participants missed a triplet, i.e., took longer than 2.5 s to
answer, the experiment continued automatically with the presen-
tation of a new triplet and neither FOE nor confidence questions
were asked.3. Results
Dependent variables were tested for normal distribution using
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) tests before conducting any analysis.
All variables were significantly normal as demonstrated by the
K–S test statistics (D): number of reported FOEs (D(28) = 0.13,
p > 0.05), number of correctly (D(28) = 0.11, p > 0.05) and incor-
rectly answered triplets (D(28) = 0.14, p > 0.05), reaction time of
the NBT (D(28) = 0.08, p > 0.05) and reaction time of the FOE report
(D(28) = 0.13, p > 0.05), gamma (D(28) = 0.12, p > 0.05), confidence
(D(28) = 0.13, p > 0.05) and percentage of error (D(28) = 0.15,
p > 0.05).3.1. Performance on the number bisection task
Given that participants had a maximum of 2.5 s to provide an
answer to each triplet, 23.7% of the trials (i.e., 45 trials, SD = 24)
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plets was not significantly different for the bisectable (mean =
22.04 ± SD = 12) and non-bisectable triplets (mean = 23.07 ± SD =
13.4), t(27) = 0.66, p = 0.51). Naturally, the missed problems were
not considered for the analysis since once a trial was missed
neither FOE reports nor confidence assessments were collected.
Participants answered three-quarters of the trials correctly
(74.2% (SD = 9.8%)), which is significantly higher than the 50%
chance level (t(27) = 13.03, p < 0.001, one-tailed). Note that misses
were already excluded from the analyses, i.e., 100% corresponds
exclusively to the number of answered trials. As revealed by a
paired sample t-test, the reaction times of bisectable and non-
bisectable triplets were not significantly different, (t(27) = 0.59,
p = 0.55, two tailed). However, the number of bisectable triplets
answered correctly (mean = 47.5 ± SD = 16) was significantly less
than the number of non-bisectable triplets answered correctly
(mean = 60.43, ± SD = 16.1), (t(27) = 3.2, p < 0.001, two tailed).
Correctly and incorrectly answered trials did not differ signifi-
cantly as to response time, (t(27) = 0.85, p = 0.39, two-tailed).
The mean reaction time (RT) ± standard deviation (SD) for all
correct trials was: 1629.2 ± 194 ms and for all incorrect trials
was: 1641.7 ± 234 ms. The reaction times did not differ either
when both types of triplets, bisectable and non-bisectable, were
considered separately. Mean RT ± SD for correct bisectable trials
was: 1669.8 ± 221 ms and for incorrect bisectable trials was:
1639.2 ± 240 ms, (t(27) = 1, p = 0.32, two-tailed). Mean RT ± SDFig. 2. Reaction time of the objectively correct and incorrect triplets. The reaction of
the bisectable and non-bisectable triplets did not differ for the objectively correct or
incorrect answered triplets. Ns = not statistically significant.
Fig. 3. The trajectory of the number of errors and reported FOEs over the
experiment are plotted with every data point representing the average of 10
subsequent trials. Each point represents the mean value of 10 trials computed
across subjects and errors bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Errors and
feelings of error (FOEs) occurred all throughout the experiment without accumu-
lating at the beginning of the experiment, demonstrating that the instructions were
clear and participants understood the task.for correct non-bisectable trials was: 1626.9 ± 209 ms and for
incorrect non-bisectable triplets was: 1661.1 ± 247 ms, (t(27) =
1.218, p = 0.23, two-tailed, see Fig. 2).3.2. FOE accuracy
Our first research question was to assess the accuracy of the
FOE. Before doing so, we verified that our paradigm was successful
in evoking reasoning errors and FOEs. Fig. 3 shows that the number
of errors and reported FOEs occurred all through the 190 trials of
the experiment, suggesting that our experimental manipulation
was successful in eliciting reasoning errors that were not the pro-
duct of comprehension errors at the beginning of the experiment.
Participants reported, on average, a FOE in 21 ± 9% of the answered
triplets (i.e., mean ± SD = 30 ± 15 FOEs on average per participant).
Bisectable and non-bisectable triplets significantly differed in the
number of FOEs reported; participants reported significantly
more FOEs for the bisectable triplets, mean ± SD = 17.6 ± 9.9, than
for the non-bisectable triplets, mean ± SD = 12.8 ± 7.3, (t(27) = 2.7,
p = 0.01, two tailed).
We tested our first hypothesis, that the FOE is a reliable signal of
error, by means of three different analyses: (1) Following the tradi-
tion in metacognitive studies (Koren et al., 2006; Nelson, 1984), we
used Kruskal–Goodman Gamma correlation (c) to measure
metacognitive resolution. The metacognitive resolution indicates
the degree to which FOE reports corresponded to errors and no-
FOEs corresponded to correctly answered tasks, i.e., how these
variables vary concurrently. Gamma measurements can reach a
value between 1 and 1, where 0 represents no relationship
between the variables or chance level, large negative values repre-
sent an inverse association, and high positive values a strong
association between the variables. Gamma was calculated within
participants using the following formula: c = (Concordances  Dis-
cordances)/(Concordances + Discordances), wherein concordances
were defined as the FOE hits, namely, cases when participants
committed an error on the NBT and reported a FOE, and also the
cases where no error occurred and no FOE was reported (correct
FOE rejection). The discordances, on the other hand, were the cases
in which no error was committed but a FOE was reported (FOE
false alarm), and those in which an error was committed but there
was not a FOE report (FOE omission). Fig. 4 shows the values (mean
percentage of each trial category over the total number of experi-
mental trials) that were used to calculate gamma.
As expected, the gamma correlation was very high, c
mean ± SD = 0.74 ± 0.17, and significantly larger than 0.5, as
demonstrated by a one sample t-test, (t(27) = 4.6, p < 0.001, one
sample). These results suggest a strong association between the
calculation errors and the FOEs, as well as between the correct
solved tasks and the no-FOEs reports. Gamma values were signifi-
cantly different for bisectable vs. non-bisectable triplets; the
gamma of the bisectable triplets was lower, c mean ± SD = 0.67 ±
0.23, than the one calculated for the non-bisectable triplets, c
mean ± SD = 0.79 ± 0.17, (t(27) = 3.5, p < 0.01, two tailed).
Additionally, a Pearson’s correlation analysis revealed that the
number of reported FOEs significantly correlated with the number
of incorrectly answered NBT (r = 0.89, p < 0.001, n = 28, see Fig. 5).3.3. Determinants of the FOE
3.3.1. Fluency
3.3.1.1. Factors influencing fluency. Before testing if fluency was a
determinant of the FOEs, we evaluated the participants’ perfor-
mance on the NBT to determine whether the mathematical factors
reported in Nuerk and colleagues study (2002) (see Section 2.2)
influenced the fluency of the response to the NBT in our experi-
Fig. 4. Accuracy of the feeling of error (FOE). Mean percentages of the categories of
trials that were defined according to the FOE reports and performance on the NBT.
Categories of trials were defined as: (1) FOE hits: reported FOEs after incorrect
responses to the NBT (dark green). (2) Correct FOE rejections: no FOEs were
reported after correct responses (light green). (3) FOE false alarms: FOEs were
reported after a correct response (dark red). (4) FOE omissions: FOEs were not
reported after incorrect responses (light red). Note that these values were used to
calculate the Kruskal–Goodman Gamma correlation.
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according to participants’ reaction time.
With this goal, we performed 2 by 2 within-subjects ANOVAs
independently for bisectable and non-bisectable triplets using
reaction time as dependent variable. For the bisectable triplets,
the factors range (wide vs. small) and multiplicativity (multiplica-
tive vs. non-multiplicative) were considered. Bisection possibility
(possible vs. impossible) and distance to mean (large vs. small) were
the factors used for the ANOVA of the non-bisectable triplets. The
detailed results of this analysis are shown in the supplementary
material given that it is a replication of previous results concerning
the mathematical properties of the NBT (Nuerk et al., 2002), (see
Section 5. Supplementary material: Mathematical factors and per-
formance on the Number Bisection Task).
3.3.1.1.1. Bisectable triplets. Triplets with wider range were
answered significantly slower than triplets with smaller range (F
(1,27) = 23.17, p < 0.001) indicating that the factor range deter-Fig. 5. Pearson correlation of the number of incorrect answered triplets and
reported feelings of error (r = 0.896, p < 0.001, n = 28). Each point represents the
averaged number of FOEs and incorrect triplets, per participant, over the 190 trials.mined the fluency of the bisectable triplets. On the other hand,
the factor multiplicativity did not show an effect on the fluency of
the triplets.
3.3.1.1.2. Non-bisectable triplets. The factors bisection possibility
(F(1,27) = 36.42, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.57) and distance to mean
(F(1,27) = 4.60, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.15) had significant effects
on the reaction time of the non-bisectable triplets. Participants
took longer to answer the bisectable possible triplets and the
triplets with smaller distance to mean (disfluent triplets) versus
the triplets without possibility of bisection and those with larger
distance to mean, respectively.
3.3.1.2. Fluency as a determinant of the FOE. After verifying that the
fluency of the answers given to the NBT was determined by some
of the factors reported by Nuerk and colleagues, we tested if disflu-
ent trials, as determined by the significant factors detailed above,
evoked more FOEs than fluent trials. We specifically performed
separate ANOVAs with the factor range for the number of FOE
reports that followed the bisectable triplets, and distance to mean
and bisection possibility for the ones that followed non-bisectable
triplets. Based on the literature on metacognition and fluency
(Benjamin et al., 1998; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005; see Koriat, 2007
for a review), we expected that disfluent bisectable triplets, i.e.,
those with larger ranges would elicit more FOEs than fluent ones.
Note that the fluency, i.e., reaction time, of the non-
multiplicative and multiplicative triplets didn’t differ significantly
in our study. Similar results were expected for disfluent non-
bisectable triplets, i.e., we expected that bisectable possible triplets
and those with shorter distance to mean would elicit more FOEs
than fluent non-bisectable ones.
We performed this analysis pooling together objectively correct
and incorrect answered triplets. A one factor (wide vs. small)
within subjects ANOVA revealed no main effects of the range
(F(1,27) = 1.01, p = 0.32, partial g2 = 0.03) on the number of the
reported FOEs concerning the bisectable triplets. On the other
hand, for the non-bisectable triplets, the number of reported FOEs
was significantly larger for disfluent triplets with small distance to
mean, mean ± SD = 4.2 ± 2.9, than for the fluent ones with larger
distance to mean, mean ± SD = 2.2 ± 1.9, (F(1,27) = 21.18, p < 0.001,
partial g2 = .44). Similarly, bisection possibility had an effect on
the number of reported FOEs. Disfluent triplets with possibility of
bisection had a larger number of reported FOEs, mean ± SD =
3.6 ± 2.4, than the fluent ones with impossibility of bisection,
mean ± SD = 2.8 ± 2.4, (F(1,27) = 5.29, p < 0.05, partial g2 = 0.16,
see Fig. 6 for a summary of the fluency effects on the number of
reported FOEs). The interaction between the two factors due to
(distance to mean ⁄ bisection possibility) was not significant for the
number of FOEs (F(1,27) = 0.87, p = 0.35, partial g2 = 0.031). Finally,
in order to rule out that the fluency effects were not exclusively
due to differences in error rates across conditions (i.e., due to a lar-
ger number of errors in the disfluent triplets vs. fluent ones), we
performed the same analysis with the significant factors (distance
to mean and bisection possibility) for correct and incorrect NBTs
separately. The factor distance to mean showed a significant effect
on the number of reported FOEs for correct (F(1,27) = 16.13,
p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.37) and incorrect triplets (F(1,27) = 13.53,
p = 0.001, partial g2 = 0.34), indicating that fluency was indeed a
determinant of the FOEs evoked in these triplets, irrespective of
their correctness. On the other hand, the factor bisection possibility
boarded on significance for correct triplets (p = 0.092). Its effect on
the incorrect triplets was not significant.
3.3.2. Post-decision evaluation processes
To find out whether the reported FOEs were the product of
continued post-decision evaluation processes, we calculated if
the reaction time of the FOE reports were generally longer after
Fig. 6. Effects of the mathematical factors on the reaction time of the NBT and the number of FOEs. The graphs show fluency effects and their relationship with the number of
FOEs for the bisectable triplets (A) and non-bisectable triplets (B) when objectively correct and incorrect triplets were averaged together. The left y-axes on each graph (A, B)
show the range of values for the reaction time of the NBT (gray column bars). The right y-axes on each graph (A, B) show the range of values for the number of FOEs (red
circles). Black stars indicate the significance level for differences in the reaction time of the NBT and red stars for the number of FOEs: ⁄p < 0.05; ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001. Error bars
indicate the upper half of the 95% confidence interval. Ns = not statistically significant.
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reports that followed a correct answer. In other words, we tested if
post-error slowing evoked by incorrectly answered triplets was
extended to the subsequent task, i.e., the FOE report. We then mea-
sured the reaction time of the FOE reports in dependence of the
occurrence of a FOE. Specifically, we calculated one way within
subjects ANOVAs on the reaction time of the FOE reports for the
bisectable and non-bisectable triplets. The factor considered for
these ANOVAs was the FOE occurrence, i.e., if participants reported
to have a FOE or not. According to the findings on error detection,
identifying an error is followed by a behavioral slowdown (Logan &
Crump, 2010; Rabbitt, 1966). We thus anticipated finding a general
effect of error detection on the reaction time of the answer to the
FOE question: FOE reports should be significantly slower than no
FOE reports. We found that FOE reports were significantly faster
after a triplet that was answered correctly compared to those that
followed a triplet that was answered incorrectly (see Fig. 7A). Both
bisectable (t(27) = 6.2, p < 0.001) and non-bisectable triplets (t
(27) = 6.2, p < 0.01) showed this effect. Moreover, for the bisect-
able NBT, the occurrence of the FOE (if participants reported to
have a FOE) had an effect on the reaction time of the FOE report
– i.e., participants took longer to report they felt they had commit-
ted an error, mean ± SD = 1007 ± 207 ms, than to report not having
a FOE, mean ± SD = 846.6 ± 254 ms, (F(1,27) = 26.26, p < 0.001, par-
tial g2 = 0.49, see Fig. 7B). Similarly, for the non-bisectable triplets,
there was a significant effect of the occurrence of the FOE (F(1,27)
= 59.1, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.68) on the reaction time of the FOE
report. Participants took longer to report that they had a FOE,
mean ± SD = 1071 ± 387 ms, than to report that they did not have
it, mean ± SD = 805 ± 240 ms, see Fig. 7B.
3.4. Confidence and the degree of awareness of missed errors
We explored participants’ degree of awareness of erroneous
responses in cases where they did not report an error (i.e., missed
errors) by assessing if there were significant differences between
the confidence ratings reported after triplets that were answered
correctly and triplets that were answered incorrectly (but which
were not described as being wrong, i.e., when participants did
not report a FOE) (paired sample t-test). Note that confidence rat-ings were collected only when participants reported that they
did not have a FOE (see section 2.3 for details). Descriptive statis-
tics and box plots (see Fig. 8A and B) show that the distribution
of the confidence ratings differed depending on whether the NBTs
were answered correctly or incorrectly. That is, despite partici-
pants reported not having FOEs, they reported having both low
and high levels of confidence spread all over the confidence scale.
Moreover, in spite of not having a FOE, the confidence reported by
the participants was significantly higher for all the objectively cor-
rect, mean ± SD = 5.1 ± 0.6, than for incorrect, mean ± SD = 3.4 ± 1.1,
trials (t = 9.25, df = 26, p < 0.001, two tailed). This was also the case
when bisectable (t = 7.88, df = 25, p < 0.001, two tailed) and non-
bisectable (t = 8.09, df = 20, p < 0.001, two tailed) NBTs were
considered separately. In general, participants were significantly
more confident about their answers for the non-bisectable
triplets, mean ± SD = 4.9 ± 0.9 than for the bisectable ones,
mean ± SD = 4.2 ± 1.1, (t = 4.8, df = 27, p < 0.001, two tailed). This
is also in line with the results reported above: non-bisectable
triplets were shown to be the easier ones (see Section 3.1).
The fact that the confidence ratings were highly accurate about
the correctness of the NBT motivated us to further explore its pos-
sible determinants. We thus performed analyses of the confidence
ratings to assess if fluency while solving the NBT also influenced
the observed variations in the confidence reports. Repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs with the same factors used for the FOE reports were
performed to determine if fluency had an effect on the confidence
ratings.
For the bisectable triplets, the factor range showed a significant
effect on the confidence reports; participants were significantly
more confident about their answer if the NBTs had a small range,
i.e., fluent triplets, mean ± SD = 5.1 ± 0.8, compared to the ones that
had wide range, i.e., disfluent triplets, mean ± SD = 4.2 ± 1.1, (F
(1,27) = 73.515, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.731). For the non-
bisectable triplets the bisection possibility and the distance to mean
had an effect on the confidence ratings. Bisection possibility; F
(1,27) = 7.305, p = 0.012, partial g2 = 0.213, distance to mean; F
(1,27) = 62,309, p < 0.001, partial g2 = 0.698. Confidence ratings
were significantly higher for impossibility of bisection, i.e., fluent
triplets, mean ± SD = 5.1 ± 0.7, than for triplets with possibility of
bisection, i.e., disfluent ones, mean ± SD = 4.9 ± 0.7. Additionally,
Fig. 7. Reaction time of FOE reports. (A) The reaction time of FOE reports reveals that post-decision evaluation processes occurred after incorrectly answered triplets
compared to correctly answered ones. (B) Participants were slower in reporting a FOE versus reporting that they did not have a FOE. Error bars indicate the upper half of the
95% confidence interval, ⁄⁄p < 0.01; ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001.
Fig. 8. Descriptive statistics of the confidence ratings. (A) Mean and standard
deviation of the confidence ratings, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001. (B) Box plots of the confidence
ratings from the correct and incorrect answered triplets.
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distance to mean, mean ± SD = 5.4 ± 0.5, as compared with disfluent
ones with smaller distance to mean, mean ± SD = 4.6 ± 0.9.4. Discussion
We used a mathematical reasoning task paired with a speeded
response paradigm to evoke mental reasoning errors, and then
asked the subjects to report their FOEs and their confidence in
the answers. This allowed us to integrate the literature on
metacognition and error detection as well as their models and
methods. All in all, we empirically showed (i) that the metacogni-
tive FOE is a reliable signal of error, (ii) this FOE is determined by
fluency (but the contribution of fluency as a determinant is limited
to the general task difficulty), (iii) that post-decision evaluation
mainly determines the occurrence of FOEs regardless of the diffi-
culty of the task, and (iv) that participants’ confidence in thecorrectness of their answers to the NBT was accurate even when
they did not report a FOE.
4.1. Motor error detection versus mental error detection
We considered that the speeded decision normally imposed in
the error detection paradigms was the method suited to study
the spontaneity and immediateness of the FOEs. However, given
the very specific types of well-defined paradigms routinely used
in the error detection tradition, in which stimulus–response rules
are simple (one-to-one) mappings known from the start and diffi-
cult to obey only due to time pressure and conflicting information
(e.g., Flanker paradigm, Simon task), this approach seems unavoid-
ably limited to the study of motor or bodily error detection. Errors
in this sort of tasks are motor errors (e.g., inability to suppress
inappropriate motor responses) rather than properly mental or
reasoning-based errors. Hence, the related awareness studied so
far in the error detection tradition has concerned the awareness
of motor errors rather than metacognitive awareness of mental
actions and processes (Proust, 2013).
In our study, we overcame this limitation of error detection
studies by adopting a mathematical reasoning task in which the
appropriate motor action is contingent upon a previous mental
calculation, so that there is no simple mapping between the correct
response and the motor action. In other words, our paradigm
allowed us to actually test participants’ monitoring of mental
errors in mathematical reasoning.
Furthermore, literature on error detection has traditionally
focused on the processing and consequences of errors (e.g.,
Dutilh et al., 2012), the mapping of errors with event-related
potentials (e.g., Chang, Davies, & Gavin, 2009; Scheffers & Coles,
2000; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, see also Wessel, 2012; for a
review) and the neural correlates of error detection using fMRI
(e.g., Ullsperger & Cramon, 2004). This focus has thus left the phe-
nomenological dimension of the error detection, i.e., the FOE, out of
the analysis. To bridge this gap, we resorted to the metacognitive
tradition’s method of asking participants to report their feelings
and metacognitive states of awareness. We complemented this
strategy by including participants’ confidence ratings about the
correction of their answers to the NBT. In this way, the present
study fruitfully integrated the methods of both the error detection
and the metacognitive traditions to address the way in which indi-
viduals detect and become aware of their mental reasoning errors.
4.2. The accuracy of the FOE
FOEs were successfully evoked in all 28 participants while they
solved a mental calculation task. On average, each participant
reported having a FOE in 21% of the NBTs that they solved, i.e.,
on average about 30 FOEs per participant. Notably, the FOEs
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were triggered neither by the uncertainty of the initial trials nor
by the tiredness of the final trials. We take this to indicate that
FOEs were recurrent phenomena even when participants were able
to perform the task well.
In line with other studies on metacognitive feelings (e.g.,
Gangemi & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2014; Paynter et al., 2009; Reder
& Ritter, 1992) and performance monitoring (e.g., Fleming,
Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Scheffers & Coles, 2000), our results pro-
vide evidence that the FOEs are very accurate. The resolution of
the FOE (as measured by c) had a mean value of 0.74 indicating
a robust association between the objectively incorrect answers
and the number of reported FOEs, as well as a strong relationship
between the objectively correct answers and the lack of FOE
reports. However, recent studies haven’t found a correlation
between metacognitive feelings and accuracy (Prowse Turner &
Thompson, 2009; Thompson, 2014; Thompson et al., 2011, 2013).
The incongruence of our findings with those of Thompson et al.
(2011, 2013) may be explained by a framing effect, i.e., the suscep-
tibility of participants to the question or instruction wordings
(Finn, 2008; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). Particularly, the
difference between the findings of Thompson and colleagues and
ours may result from how the metacognitive question is asked:
whereas they asked about the feeling of rightness and certainty
(FOR-framed question), we asked for the feeling of error (FOE-
framed question). As a result, a FOR-framed question may lead to
lower accuracy and overconfidence as compared to a FOE-framed
question. This effect is similar to the framing effect found in
metamemory studies which showed that remember-framed ques-
tions lead to inaccuracy and overconfidence in the judgements of
learning (JOLs) as compared with the forget-framed JOLs (Finn,
2008; Koriat et al., 2004). Since Thompson et al.’s (2011, 2013)
studies framed the metacognitive question in terms of rightness
and certainty, this might have cued the participants to overlook
their reasoning errors. Thus, a systematic study comparing
positively-framed and negatively-framed metacognitive assess-
ments in reasoning tasks appears promising.
It is worth noting that the instructions and time restriction
imposed in our paradigm ensured that the FOE report was the first
response that quickly and intuitively came to participants’
awareness. Given that participants had limited time to answer
the NBT – limiting their ability to re-calculate or actively reflect
on the performed mental calculation – and were given only 2 sec-
onds to spontaneously report whether they felt they had commit-
ted an error, our results suggest that this type of feeling-based
metacognition (Koriat, 2007) provided participants with accurate
assessments of their ongoing cognitive processes without the
necessity of effortful and analytical thinking.
4.3. The limits of fluency
It is a well-known fact that fluency plays a central role in the
monitoring of memory retrieval as well as in the monitoring of rea-
soning (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 1993; Oppenheimer, 2008).
In our study, fluency – or the easiness with which triplets were
solved – was operationalized considering 4 mathematical factors
that have been shown to influence the reaction time of the NBT
in previous studies (Nuerk et al., 2002) (see Section 5. Supplemen-
tary material). That is, fluency was quantified using the reaction
time of the answers to the triplets in dependence of the mathemat-
ical factors that have been shown to determine reaction time and
error probability in the NBT.
In the present experiment, range was one of the factors that
determined the fluency of the bisectable triplets. However, disflu-
ent triplets with larger range did not significantly evoke more FOEs
than fluent ones with shorter range. In the case of non-bisectabletriplets, the factors distance to mean and bisection possibility signif-
icantly determined the fluency with which triplets were solved (for
correct and incorrect triplets analyzed together). In these cases, the
number of FOEs significantly increased for disfluent triplets (i.e.,
those with small distance to mean and possibility of bisection).
To disentangle fluency effects on the FOEs from error rates across
conditions (i.e., to assess if FOEs were determined by differences
in fluency and not by increased error rates in disfluent triplets),
we also performed this analysis separately for trials in which the
NBT was solved correctly and incorrectly. This analysis revealed
that the factor distance to mean had an effect on the number of
reported FOEs for objectively correct and incorrect triplets. The
effect of the factor bisection possibility, however, showed a trend
toward statistical significance for the correct answered triplets.
Considering that the number of trials that were non-bisectable,
correctly answered and with a FOE was only 3.2 on average, it is
possible that the effect size of the bisection possibility (partial
g2 = 0.16, when all triplets were analyzed together) was not strong
enough to reach statistical significance with this small number of
trials.
In sum, our results showed that fluency determined the
occurrence of FOEs in the non-bisectable triplets but not in the
bisectable triplets. A possible interpretation of this finding is that
fluency, as a determinant of the FOE, is limited to the task’s general
difficulty. As our results demonstrate, the bisectable triplets were
in general more difficult to solve than non-bisectable ones:
significantly fewer bisectable triplets were answered correctly
compared to non-bisectable ones (see Section 3.1). Furthermore,
participants were significantly more confident about their answers
for the non-bisectable compared to the bisectable triplets (see
Section 3.4). We thus hypothesize that the fluency with which
participants solve a task may determine the FOEs up to the point
where a ceiling effect is reached and the effort needed to solve
the task disrupts the link between fluency and the FOE. Previous
studies have shown that effects of fluency can be disrupted when
the cause of low fluency is known (Oppenheimer, 2006) or the
system processing fluency effects is presented with competitive
information (Topolinski & Strack, 2010). In the case of the current
study, the difficulty of solving the mathematical task within time
restrictions might have caused a disruption of the effect of fluency
on the FOEs. Thus, this disruption might have caused a decline in
the accuracy of the FOEs. This hypothesis is supported by the fact
that the number of FOEs was significantly larger and the gamma
resolution significantly reduced in the bisectable triplets as com-
pared to the non-bisectable triplets (see Section 3.2).
4.4. Post-decision evaluation
The second factor assumed to determine the FOEs, besides
fluency, was post-decision evaluation processes. We found a
post-error slowing in the subsequent task. Particularly, partici-
pants took significantly longer to respond to the FOE question after
they have made an error on the NBT. This finding is in line with
previous demonstrations that trial-to-trial slowdown can extend
from a first task to a secondary task (Cho et al., 2009; Forster &
Cho, 2014; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011). Secondly, according to
our hypothesis, we found that participants were significantly
slower in reporting that they had a FOE than in reporting that they
did not have a FOE; and this was the case for both types of triplets
(bisectable and non-bisectable).
We take these results to support the previous findings that a
behavioral slowdown is linked to error detection (Jentzsch &
Dudschig, 2009; Logan & Crump, 2010; Rabbitt, 1966). However,
the phenomenon of post-error slowing has also been previously
described as the product of other cognitive processes different than
post-decision evaluation processes. For example, the cognitive
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control allocated to enhance successive performance (Gehring &
Fencsik, 2001). The orienting account puts forward that behavioral
slowing is the result of an orienting reaction toward an unpre-
dicted and/or infrequent event, in this particular case, an error
(Notebaert et al., 2009). Notably, in our study it is particularly dif-
ficult to disentangle the evaluation and the orienting accounts,
since both errors and FOEs were infrequent. Although a dissocia-
tion between these three accounts is out of the scope of the present
study, it was particularly interesting for the present study’s goals
to test if the occurrence of a FOE was associated with behavioral
slowdown. Moreover, recent literature suggests that these
accounts are not mutually exclusive (Danielmeier & Ullsperger,
2011), i.e., the three models together could explain the behavioral
slowing observed after an error.
In summary, our results suggest that both fluency and post-
decision evaluation processes are determinants of the FOE, i.e.,
both are complementary when evaluating one’s own performance
and contribute to determining the FOEs. The high accuracy of the
FOEs found in our study is explained by the parallel interaction
between the fluency and post-decision evaluation processes. We
hypothesize that once the effect of fluency has reached its limits,
post-decision evaluation processes keep monitoring the perfor-
mance, allowing participants to detect their errors even when tasks
become very difficult.
4.5. Confidence and the degree of awareness of missed errors
Finally, we were interested in the relationship between FOE and
confidence. Participants were asked to rate the confidence in their
answers to the NBT only in cases where they did not report having
a FOE. Interestingly, our results show that in some cases where
participants didn’t report a FOE, they could still have low confi-
dence. Moreover, their confidence was accurate insofar as it was
significantly lower for the objectively incorrect answers than for
the objectively correct ones. The accuracy of their confidence
ratings suggests that participants implicitly detected their errors
in the NBT, despite their lack of FOE reports.
These results are in accordance with previous error detection
studies proposing that performance monitoring does not work in
a binary fashion – where errors are either detected or not – but
in a continuous and graded manner (Boldt & Yeung, 2015;
Murphy et al., 2012; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Thus, in cases when
participants are forced to make a binary judgment, they must
impose an arbitrary threshold that excludes some slightly detected
errors (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). This way, confidence could be
used as a measurement of subthreshold FOEs, in line with the
growing literature that points to the fact that subjects implicitly
detect (they are slightly aware of) some of their ‘‘unreported”
errors (De Neys, 2012, 2014; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys
et al., 2011). Thus, the low confidence reported after an error in
the NBT (without FOE report) suggests that the monitoring system
accumulates accessible information about the ‘‘wrongness” of a
response until a threshold is reached and a FOE is evoked.
Furthermore, we performed post hoc analyses to explore if the
fluency with which triplets were solved was also a determinant of
the confidence report. The three factors that were used to opera-
tionalize fluency in this study (i.e., range, distance to mean, and
bisection possibility) showed significant effects on the confidence
reported by the participants, whereby disfluent trials were associ-
ated with lower confidence ratings compared to fluent ones.
Thus, the present study highlights the important role of feeling-
based metacognition for cognitive monitoring as a tool for uncov-
ering inaccuracies in mental calculations. However, it remains to
be determined whether the reported findings could be expanded
to other real-world situations and to other cognitive activities.Acknowledgements
We thank Kateryna Samoilova, Daniel Morales, Korbinian
Moeller, Kourken Michaelian, Juan Pablo Bermúdez Rey, and the
three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of the manuscript. We would also like to thank Asher
Koriat for his advice regarding our experimental design, and Eric
Schwitzgebel and Santiago Amaya for conceptual suggestions. This
study was funded by the Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative
Neuroscience (CIN) at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen.
The CIN is an Excellence Cluster funded by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) within the framework of the Excel-
lence Initiative (EXC 307).
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.
09.005.
References
Arango-Muñoz, S. (2014). The nature of epistemic feelings. Philosophical Psychology,
27(February 2015), 193–211.
Arango-Muñoz, S., & Michaelian, K. (2014). Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions:
Review and introduction to the focus section. Philosophical Inquiries, 2(1),
97–122.
Benjamin, A. S., Bjork, R. A., & Schwartz, B. L. (1998). The mismeasure of memory:
When retrieval fluency is misleading as a metamnemonic index. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 127(1), 55–68.
Boekaerts, M., & Rozendaal, J. S. (2010). Using multiple calibration indices in order
to capture the complex picture of what affects students’ accuracy of feeling of
confidence. Learning and Instruction, 20(5), 372–382.
Boldt, A., & Yeung, N. (2015). Shared neural markers of decision confidence and
error detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(8), 3478–3484.
Brown, A. S. (2012). The tip of the tongue state. Taylor & Francis.
Brown, R., & McNeill, D. (1966). The ‘‘tip of the tongue” phenomenon. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5(4), 325–337.
Chang, W. P., Davies, P. L., & Gavin, W. J. (2009). Error monitoring in college students
with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Journal of Psychophysiology, 23,
113–125.
Cho, R. Y., Orr, J. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2009). Generalized signaling for
control: Evidence from postconflict and posterror performance adjustments.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 35(4),
1161–1177.
Danielmeier, C., & Ullsperger, M. (2011). Post-error adjustments. Frontiers in
Psychology, 2(September), 233.
De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 7, 28–38.
De Neys, W. (2014). Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some
clarifications. Thinking & Reasoning, 20(January 2015), 169–187.
De Neys, W., Cromheeke, S., & Osman, M. (2011). Biased but in doubt: Conflict and
decision confidence. PLoS ONE, 6(1), e15954.
De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of
thinking. Cognition, 106, 1248–1299.
De Sousa, R. (2009). Epistemic feelings. Mind and Matter, 7(2), 139–161.
Dhar, M., Wiersema, J. R., & Pourtois, G. (2011). Cascade of neural events leading
from error commission to subsequent awareness revealed using EEG source
imaging. PLoS ONE, 6(5), 19–22.
Dutilh, G., Vandekerckhove, J., Forstmann, B. U., Keuleers, E., Brysbaert, M., &
Wagenmakers, E. J. (2012). Testing theories of post-error slowing. Attention,
Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(2), 454–465.
Endrass, T., Franke, C., & Kathmann, N. (2005). Error awareness in a saccade
countermanding task. Journal of Psychophysiology, 19(2003), 275–280.
Finn, B. (2008). Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control.Memory &
Cognition, 36(4), 813–821.
Fleming, S. M., Huijgen, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Prefrontal contributions to
metacognition in perceptual decision-making. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(18),
6117–6225.
Forster, S. E., & Cho, R. Y. (2014). Context specificity of post-error and post-conflict
cognitive control adjustments. PLoS ONE, 9(3).
Gangemi, A., & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2014). Feelings of error in reasoning — In
search of a phenomenon. Thinking & Reasoning (January 2015), 37–41.
Gangemi, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., & Mancini, F. (2014). Feelings of error in
reasoning — in search of a phenomenon. Thinking & Reasoning, 1–14 (ahead-of-
print).
Gehring, W. J., & Fencsik, D. E. (2001). Functions of the medial frontal cortex in the
processing of conflict and errors. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal
of the Society for Neuroscience, 21(23), 9430–9437.
120 A.L. Fernandez Cruz et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 110–120Hughes, G., & Yeung, N. (2011). Dissociable correlates of response conflict and error
awareness in error-related brain activity. Neuropsychologia, 49(3), 405–415.
Jentzsch, I., & Dudschig, C. (2009). Why do we slow down after an error?
Mechanisms underlying the effects of posterror slowing. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 62(March 2015), 209–218.
Jiang, Y., & Hong, J. (2014). It feels fluent, but not right: The interactive effect of
expected and experienced processing fluency on evaluative judgment. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 147–152.
Kelley, C., & Lindsay, D. (1993). Remembering mistaken for knowing: Ease of
retrieval as a basis for confidence in answers to general knowledge questions.
Journal of Memory and Language, 32(1), 1–2.
Koren, D., Seidman, L. J., Goldsmith, M., & Harvey, P. D. (2006). Real-world
cognitive—and metacognitive—dysfunction in schizophrenia: A new approach
for measuring (and remediating) more ‘‘right stuff”. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32
(2), 310–326.
Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that we know? The accessibility model of the
feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100(4), 609–639.
Koriat, A. (2000). The feeling of knowing: Some metatheoretical implications for
consciousness and control. Consciousness and Cognition, 9(2 Pt 1), 149–171.
Koriat, A., Bjork, R. A., Sheffer, L., & Bar, S. K. (2004). Predicting one’s own forgetting:
The role of experience-based and theory-based processes. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 133(4), 643–656.
Koriat, A., & Ma’ayan, H. (2005). The effects of encoding fluency and retrieval
fluency on judgments of learning. Journal of Memory and Language, 52(4),
478–492.
Koriat, A. (2007). Metacognition and consciousness. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch,
& E. Thompson (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of consciousness. New York, USA:
Cambridge University Press.
Logan, G. D., & Crump, M. J. C. (2010). Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal
hierarchical error detection in skilled typists. Science, 329(October), 571–575.
Moeller, K., Klein, E., Fischer, M. H., Nuerk, H.-C., & Willmes, K. (2011).
Representation of multiplication facts – Evidence for partial verbal coding.
Behavioral and Brain Functions: BBF, 7, 25.
Moeller, K., Wood, G., Doppelmayr, M., & Nuerk, H. C. (2010). Oscillatory EEG
correlates of an implicit activation of multiplication facts in the number
bisection task. Brain Research, 1320, 85–94.
Moulin, C. J. A., & Souchay, C. (2013). Epistemic feelings and memory. In T. Perfect &
S. Lindsay (Eds.), Handbook of applied memory (pp. 520–539). SAGE.
Murphy, P. R., Robertson, I. H., Allen, D., Hester, R., & O’Connell, R. G. (2012). An
electrophysiological signal that precisely tracks the emergence of error
awareness. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6(March), 65.
Nelson, T. O. (1984). A comparison of current measures of the accuracy of feeling-
of-knowing predictions. Psychological Bulletin, 95(1), 109–133.
Nieuwenhuis, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Blom, J., Band, G. P., & Kok, A. (2001). Error-
related brain potentials are differentially related to awareness of response
errors: Evidence from an antisaccade task. Psychophysiology, 38, 752–760.
Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Van Opstal, F., Gevers, W., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. (2009).
Post-error slowing: An orienting account. Cognition, 111(2), 275–279.
Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (2011). Conflict and error adaptation in the Simon task.
Acta Psychologica, 136, 212–216.
Nuerk, H., Geppert, B., van Herten, M., & Willmes, K. (2002). On the impact of
different number representations in the number bisection task. Cortex, 1,
691–715.
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized
irrespective of necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 20(October 2005), 139–156.
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). The secret life of fluency. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12
(6), 237–241.Paynter, C. A., Reder, L. M., & Kieffaber, P. D. (2009). Knowing we know before we
know: ERP correlates of initial feeling-of-knowing. Neuropsychologia, 47(3),
796–803.
Proust, J. (2013). The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self-awareness.
Oxford University Press.
Prowse Turner, J. A., & Thompson, V. A. (2009). The role of training, alternative
models, and logical necessity in determining confidence in syllogistic reasoning.
Thinking & Reasoning, 15(March 2015), 69–100.
Rabbitt, P. (1966). Errors and error correction in choice-response tasks. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 71(2), 264–272.
Reder, L. M., & Ritter, F. E. (1992). What determines initial feeling of knowing?
Familiarity with question terms, not with the answer. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(3), 435.
Scheffers, M. K., & Coles, M. G. (2000). Performance monitoring in a confusing
world: Error-related brain activity, judgments of response accuracy, and types
of errors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
26(1), 141–151.
Schwartz, B. L. (2001). Tip-of-the-tongue states: Phenomenology, mechanism, and
lexical retrieval.. Experimental Psychology. Psychology Press (pp. 239–240).
Psychology Press.
Schwartz, B. L., & Metcalfe, J. (2011). Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states: Retrieval,
behavior, and experience. Memory & Cognition, 39(5), 737–749.
Schwarz, N. (2010). Meaning in context: Metacognitive experiences. In B. Mesquita,
L. F. Barrett, & R. E. Smith (Eds.), The mind in context (pp. 105–125). New York:
Guilford.
Steinhauser, M., & Yeung, N. (2010). Decision processes in human performance
monitoring. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for
Neuroscience, 30(46), 15643–15653.
Thompson, V. A. (2009). Dual process theories: A metacognitive perspective. In In
two minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, V. (2014). What intuitions are. . . and are not. Psychology of Learning and
Motivation, 60, 35–75.
Thompson, V. A., & Johnson, S. C. (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic
thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 20(January 2015), 215–244.
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and
metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63(3), 107–140.
Thompson, V. A., Turner, J. A. P., Pennycook, G., Ball, L., Brack, H., Ophir, Y., &
Ackerman, R. (2013). The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency as
metacognitive cues for initiating analytic thinking. Cognition, 128(2), 237–251.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.09.012.
Topolinski, S., & Strack, F. (2010). False fame prevented: Avoiding fluency effects
without judgmental correction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98
(5), 721–733. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019260.
Ullsperger, M., & Yves von Cramon, D. (2004). Neuroimaging of Performance
Monitoring: Error Detection and Beyond. Cortex, 0010-9452, 40(4–5), 593–604.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70155-2.
Vickers, D., & Lee, M. D. (1998). Dynamic models of simple judgements: I. Properties
of a self-regulating accumulator. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life
Sciences, 2, 169–194.
Vickers, D., & Lee, M. D. (2000). Dynamic models of simple judgments: II. Properties
of a self-organizing PAGAN (parallel, adaptive, generalized accumulator
network) model for multi-choice tasks. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and
Life Sciences, 4(1), 1–31.
Wessel, J. R. (2012). Error awareness and the error-related negativity: Evaluating
the first decade of evidence. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6(April), 88.
Yeung, N., & Summerfield, C. (2012). Metacognition in human decision-making:
Confidence and error monitoring. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
of London: Series B, Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1310–1321.
